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COMMENTS
permitting the holder in due course to enforce any completed
instrument may also limit the importance of the defense.
Further, the difference in approach to the effect of altera-
tions indicates that the Code has lessened the importance of the
defense. While the NIL stated that "any other change or addi-
tion which alters the effect of the instrument in any respect"
is a material alteration which results in avoidance of the instru-
ment, the Code provides that "no other alteration discharges any
party" as against any person other than a subsequent holder in
due course. The "finality" of the Code's provision leaves little
room for coverage of unforeseeable types of alterations.
The wisdom of these changes is a matter of speculation. The
comments accompanying the text of section 3-407 state no pur-
pose for the changes that were made, but merely explain what
the changes are. The result, or at least the tendency, of the
changes is to place the holder in a better position to overcome
the defense of material alteration. This undoubtedly will en-
courage more ready acceptance of commercial paper in business
transactions.
John S. White, Jr.
The Effect of the Adoption of the Proposed Uniform
Commercial Code on the Negotiable Instruments
Law of Louisiana-The Impostor Rule
An impostor is one who by impersonation of another induces
a party to draw a negotiable instrument payable to the order of
the impersonated person and to deliver it to him (the impostor).
If the drawer' is deceived and surrenders possession to the im-
postor believing him to be the named payee, the impostor ac-
quires title to the instrument and an endorsement by him in
the name of the impersonated person to a third party is effective.
Thus, when the fraud is discovered, as between the drawer, who
is the first victim, and an endorsee from the impostor, who is
the second victim, the former must bear the loss.2 The Nego-
tiable Instruments Law contains no provision governing the im-
1. Drawer is not used in the limited sense that it refers only to authors'
drafts or checks; it is used in the broad sense to include the maker of a note.
2. For elaboration of this discussion, see BRrToN, BILs AND NOTES § 151(1048).
1955]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVI
postor situation; the rules have been developed in the jurispru-
dence. The purpose of this Comment is to discuss that develop-
ment in Louisiana and in other states so that a comparison can
be made between the present impostor rule and the one proposed
in section 3-405 of the Uniform Commercial Code.8
Because the impostor rule has been created by the courts, an
analysis of the jurisprudence is necessary to preface a compari-
son of the present rule with the proposed rule in the Code. Ac-
cording to the majority of American jurisdictions, 4 the drawer
is held to have intended to make the impostor the payee despite
his assumed name. They hold that the drawer intends to deal
with the actual person before him, regardless of his true iden-
tity. By application of this rule, it follows that endorsement by
the impostor is not a forgery as defined by section 23 of the
NIL.5 Consequently, the instrument is not rendered "wholly in-
operative."6 The endorsement transfers title to the endorsee
who takes the instrument without knowledge of the fraud.7 When
the fraud is subsequently discovered, the loss falls on the drawer
who initiated the transaction rather than on the drawee or other
person to whom the instrument was endorsed. The rationale for
the rule seems to be that the first party who is deceived8 should
bear the loss, provided all deceived parties are innocent.9
3. This section, which is discussed at page 123 infra embodies the proposed
statutory rule.
4. Smith v. Mechanics' and Traders' Bank, 6 La. Ann. 610 (1851) ; Meridian
Nat. Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 7 Ind. App. 322, 33 N.E. 247 (1893); Mont-
gomery Garage Co. v. Manufacturers' Liability & Insurance Co., 94 N.J.L. 152,
109 AUt. 296 (1920) ; Hartford v. Greenwich Bank, 157 App. Div. 448, 142 N.Y.
Supp. 387 (1st Dep't 1915), affirmed, 215 N.Y. 726, 109 N.E. 1077 (1915) ; see
Annot., 22 A.L.R. 1224, 1228 (1923).
5. NIL § 23: "When a signature is forged or made without the authority of
the person whose signature it purports to be, it is wholly inoperative, and no
right to retain the instrument, or to give a discharge therefor, or to enforce pay-
ment thereof against any party thereto, can be acquired through or under such
signature, unless the party against whom it is sought to enforce such right, is
precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority." LA. R.S. 7:23
(1950) is identical.
6. Ibid.
7. See cases cited 22 A.L.R. 1224 (1923).
8. Any contest over who should bear the loss when'the fraud is discovered
is between the first and second victims of the impostor. The first victim may be
the drawer before whom the impostor appeared or he may be merely an endorser
of an instrument previously made payable to him, the first victim. The second
victim is the person to whom the impostor endorses after his fraudulent induce-
ment of the first victim. Note that when the impostor endorses to the second
victim he possesses at least one of the indicia of ownership, namely, possession.
9. BRITTON, BILLS AND NoTEs § 151 (1943) ; see 8 Am. Jur., Bills and Notes§ 602 (1937) ; Hafner, Bills and Notes -Impostor Rule, 25 NOTRE DAME LAW.
140 (1949) ; Steinheimer, Impact of the Commercial Code of Liability of Parties
to Negotiable Instruments in Michigan, 53 MiCH. L. REv. 171, 177 (1954);
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One should be careful to distinguish between the impostor
rule and the rule governing the fictitious payee situation. The
latter rule is codified in section 9(3) of the NIL. Under that
section, when an instrument is payable to the order of a fictitious
or non-existing person, it will be considered as payable to bearer
if "such fact were known to the person making it so payable."'1
Louisiana has adopted a broader rule." It provides that if the
initiating party's "agent or employee who supplies the name of
such payee"' 2 has knowledge of the discrepancy in names of the
payees, then the instrument is payable to bearer. This quoted
phrase includes the situation where an employee of the drawer
"pads" the payroll with fictitious names; the drawer-employer
merely takes the listed payroll and draws the checks without fur-
ther examination.
The most evident distinction between the impostor and fic-
titious payee rules is that knowledge of the discrepancy on the
part of the drawer, whether actual or imputed, is essential in the
fictitious payee situation in order for the instrument to become
bearer paper. On the other hand, in the impostor situation, the
drawer has no knowledge that the named payee is not the person
physically before him. In addition, the instrument does not be-
come bearer paper, but still requires an endorsement to effect a
valid transfer. Another difference in the two situations pertains
to the intention of the drawer. In the fictitious payee situation
the drawer intends to pay a person other than the named payee
because the latter is known to be fictitious. In the impostor sit-
uation, the drawer does not have this intention since he does not
know of the discrepancy between the named payee and impostor
Sutherland, Logic, Eperience, and Negotiable Paper, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 230,
243.
10. NIL § 9: "The instrument is payable to bearer:
"(3) When it is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing person,
and such fact was known to the person making it so payable .... 
11. Pursuant to the recommendation of the American Bankers Association in
the proposed Fictitious Payee Act, Louisiana's provision regarding fictitious
payees was amended by La. Acts 1942, No. 312, p. 1018 to read: "The instrument
is payable to bearer: "...
"(3) When it is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing or living
person not intended to have any interest in it, and such fact was known to the
person making it so payable, or known to his employee or other agent who supplies
the name of such payee." (Amendment italicized.) LA. R.S. 7:9(3) (1950).
"The purpose of the amendment is to place responsibility upon the drawer of
an instrument for the acts of his agent, who names a fictitious payee, without
the drawer's knowledge. . . ." AmERICAN BANKERS AssocIATION, RECOMMENDED
STATE LEGISLATION (1942). Idaho, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Montana had
adopted identical provisions prior to the amendment in Louisiana. 2 PATON, DIGEST
1867 (1942).
12. For quoted text, see note 11 supra.
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before him. Therefore, any intent must be imputed to the drawer
in the latter situation.'8
In making the attribution of intent the majority of courts'4
have ignored another possible intention of the drawer, namely,
to deal with the named payee. The latter intention is recognized
if the drawer knew or had had previous dealings with the named
payee or the impostor.'5 In such a situation, the court shifts the
loss to the second victim (usually the drawee bank) by holding
that the dominant intention of the drawer was to deal only with
the named payee. The imputing of an intent to the drawer to
deal with the person before him rather than the named payee is
known as the "dominant intent" theory and is employed by the
majority of courts. Their reasoning is based on the equitable
rule that as between two equally innocent parties to an instru-
ment, usually the drawer and the endorsee, the burden of loss
should fall on the initial victim, the drawer. Like any legal fic-
tion, this one will not withstand close analysis, but it does effec-
tuate an equitable result. 10 Most of the cases supporting the
minority view,'7 namely, that the second victim, the endorsee,
should bear the loss, are distinguishable on their facts ;18 that is,
the drawer knew or had had previous dealings with the named
payee and thus intended to deal only with him. An illustrative
case is Tolman v. American National Bank,19 in which the court
held that the drawer intended to pay the named payee only and
13. The drawer believes the impostor before him to be that person whom he
represents himself to be. The intention to pay that person is imputed to the
drawer by a fiction so that the latter shall bear any loss occasioned by subsequent
endorsement from the impostor to a good faith purchaser.
14. See cases cited note 4 supra.
15. See cases cited note 17 infra.
16. It can be argued in support of the creation of the fiction that section 61 of
the NIL provides a basis therefor. That section states that "the drawer by draw-
ing the instrument admits the existence of the payee and his then capacity to
endorse." It is submitted, however, that that argument can be refuted on the
ground that the drawer admits the existence of the named payee only and does
not necessarily admit that he intends to pay the person physically before him
regardless of his identity. Therefore, section 61 of the NIL does not seem to
provide a satisfactory statutory basis for the impostor rule. For a sound criticism
of the view that section 61 substantiates the impostor rule, see Comment, Alloca-
tion of Losses from Check Forgeries Under the Law of Negotiable Ia8trumentw
and the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 YArz L.J. 417, 465 (1953).
17. Cohen v. Lincoln Savings Bank of Brooklyn, 275 N.Y. 399, 10 N.E.2d 457
(1937) ; see Tolman v. American National Bank, 22 R.I. 462, 48 AU. 480 (1901).
For an exhaustive examination of this minority view, see Abel, The Impostor
Payee: Or, Rhode Island Was Right, 1940 Wis. L. REv. 161.
18. See note 19 infra.
19. 22 R.I. 462, 48 AUt. 480 (1901) ; see Cohen v. Lincoln Savings Bank, 275
N.Y. 399, 10 N.E.2d 457 (1937), where the court rejected the "dominant intent"
view because of the lack of prior dealings between the first victim and the impostor.
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that an endorsement by the impostor was a forgery of the named
payee's signature under NIL section 23.20
Most impostor cases arise out of face-to-face transactions,
however. The majority of courts2' hold the first victim of the
impostor (usually the drawer) liable for the loss in this situa-
tion. A case illustrating this view is Montgomery Garage v.
Manufacturer's Liability Insurance Co.,22 where the court held
the drawer liable, stating that he intended to make the check
payable to the person before him. The court stated that "a man's
name is the verbal designation by which he is known, but the
man's visible presence is a surer means of identification."' ' The
court concluded that the endorsee, the second victim of the im-
postor, should be relieved of liability.
There is no divergence of view, however, if the person be-
fore the drawer represents himself to be the agent of the named
payee. In such a case no title passes to the impostor agent be-
cause the intent of the drawer was not to pay the person phys-
ically before him but to pay the named payee whom he had not
seen. Consequently, the endorsement of the impostor agent is
a forgery and passes no title to a bona fide purchaser.24
A few cases involving impostor situations have arisen
through transactions by mail. In those cases the majority view
is the same as in face-to-face transactions, namely, that the loss
should fall on the first victim of the impostor. The rationale is
that the first victim should bear the loss because he intended to
deal with the writer of the letter rather than the named payee.
A case illustrative of a mail transaction is Uriola v. Twin Falls
Bank and Trust Co.,25 in which the court held the drawer of a
check liable for the resulting loss as against a bona fide pur-
chaser because the drawer had mailed the check without investi-
gating the payee.28 The minority view27 in these mail transac-
20. For quotation of text of section 23, see note 5 supra.
21. See note 4 supra.
22. 94 N.J.L. 152, 109 Atl. 296 (1920).
23. Id. at 155, 109 Atl. at 297.
24. For example of both agent and principal impostor situations, see Russell
v. Second National Bank, 136 N.J.L. 270, 55 A.2d 211 (1947) ; see UCC 3405,
comment 2.
25. 37 Idaho 332, 215 Pac. 1080 (1923).
26. See Continental-American Bank and Trust Co. v. United States, 161 F.2d
935 (Sth Cir. 1947), where the court held the drawer government liable for the
loss on an allotment check made payable to and endorsed by an impostor war
widow to her bank. For casenotes favoring the application of the impostor rule
to such an impersonal drawer in a mail transaction, see Notes, 1950 WAsH. U.L.Q.
130, 25 NoTRE DAmE LAW. 140 (1949) ; for notes contra, see 1 MEaCER L. REY.
297 (1949), 7 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 94 (1949). See also dissent in United States
v. Continental American Bank & Trust Co., 175 F.2d 271, 272 (5th Cir. 1949).
27. American Surety Co. v. Empire Trust Co., 262 N.Y. 281, 186 N.E. 436
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tions is also the same as in face-to-face transactions, namely,
that the drawer intended to deal only with the named payee. The
fact that distinguishes most of these cases is that the drawer
had investigated the credit or character of the named payee and
thereby formulated an intention to deal only with him and not
with the impostor writer.
The impostor rule as developed by the jurisprudence is not
limited to the original parties to the instrument. For example,
if the person deceived is the payee of a check who endorsed to
the impostor, he is held liable as against a subsequent good faith
endorsee from the impostor. Then, too, the victim might get his
bank to issue a cashier's check to the impostor. In this case, even
though the procurer is not a party to the instrument, neverthe-
less the loss will fall on him.28 If the impostor procures a certifi-
cation from a bank representing himself to be the payee, the
certifying bank becomes liable as if it had drawn the check to
the impostor and the innocent drawer is discharged. 29 In regard
to impersonation of a non-existent person, the majority of
courts hold the drawer liable on the theory that he, at least,
should have known whether the named payee existed. 30
(1933). There the drawer savings bank was induced through the mails to send a
check to the impostor for $9,000, representing the deposits of one of the drawer's
customers. The drafts were presented to the drawee bank and were paid. The court
held the drawee liable for the loss, stating that the drawer's initial negligence did
not relieve the drawee of the obligation to pay only the named payee. Accord:
Moore v. Moultrie Banking Co., 39 Ga. App. 687, 148 S.E. 311 (1929) ; Mercan-
tile National Bank v. Silverman, 148 App. Div. 1, 132 N.Y. Supp. 1017 (1st Dep't
1911), affirmed, 210 N.Y. 567, 104 N.E. 1134 (1914). But see Uriola v. Twin
Falls Bank and Trust Co., 37 Idaho 332, 215 Pac. 1080 (1923). There the im-
postor stole a certificate of deposit and solicited a loan through the mails from
the drawer with the certificate as security. The money lender sent the impostor a
cashier's check in the name of the owner of the certificate; the impostor endorsed
the check to a third party. The court held the money lender-the procurer of
the cashier's check- liable because of his failure to investigate the payee. Accord,
Boatsman v. Stockmen's National Bank, 56 Colo. 495, 138 Pac. 764 (1914); Pen-
insular State Bank v. First National Bank, 245 Mich. 179, 222 N.W. 157 (1928).
28. If a bank issues a cashier's check upon order of its depositor, it seems
logical that the procurer-depositor should be held liable as against a third party
if the impostor payee has deceived both parties. It is as though the depositor had
drawn the instrument himself rather than having procured a cashier's check from
the bank which is credited against his account. For further discussion of this
analogy, see Abel, The Impostor Payee: Or, Rhode Island Was Right, 1940 Wis.
L. Riy. 161, 177.
29. Meridian National Bank v. Shelbyville First National Bank, 7 Ind. App.
322, 33 N.E. 247, 34 N.E. 608 (1893) ; Merchants' Loan and Trust Co. v. Bank
of Metropolis, 7 Daly 137 (N.Y.C.P. 1877).
30. Meridian National Bank v. Shelbyville First National Bank, 7 Ind. App.
322, 33 N.E. 247, 34 N.E. 608 (1893). For a discussion of the problem see Abel,
The Impostor Payee: Or, Rhode Island Was Right, 1940 Wis. L. Rav. 161, 180.
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Impostor Rule in Louisiana
On the basis of the few cases decided in Louisiana on the im-
postor problem, it would seem that the courts of this state would
probably adhere to the majority view that holds the drawer
liable for the loss. The most recent decision is that of Allan
Ware Pontiac, Inc. v. First National Bank,3 ' a 1941 court of
appeal decision. The dictum in the case is more important than
the holding for the purpose of this development, but both will be
stated for clarity. The court held that the loss on a fraudulently
procured check should fall on the drawee, the second endorsee
from the impostors, rather than on the drawer who had been
deceived initially. The court's decision was based on the peculiar
facts of the case. The impostors were husband and wife, but
only the husband appeared before the drawer and induced him
to draw the check in question. The check was drawn payable to
"H. C. and Mamie Maxwell" and was presented to the impostor
husband. Both the impostor husband and wife endorsed to a
third party, but the wife's signature was held to be a forgery
for which the drawee was liable, unless it could establish the
negligence of the drawer. The court stated, in dictum, that had
the husband been the sole payee, or if both impersonators had
appeared before the drawer, then title would have passed to the
impostors and the drawer would have been held liable for the
loss. Since the impostor wife had not presented herself to the
drawer at the time the check was procured by her husband, the
court refused to impute to the drawer an intention to pay her,
as well as her husband, rather than the named payees. This
ruling, however, indicates that the loss would probably be placed
on the drawer in a typical face-to-face transaction, namely,
where the impostor payee appears before the drawer personally.
Aside from the dictum in the Allan Ware Pontiac case, the
other impostor cases indicating Louisiana's tendency to follow
the majority rule are quite old. In an 1851 case ' 2 the Supreme
Court held the drawer liable for the loss occasioned by the draw-
ing of a check payable to an impostor in the name of the im-
personated payee in payment for a forged bill fraudulently en-
dorsed to the drawer by the impostor. The latter had then
endorsed the check to the defendant drawee bank. In holding
the drawer liable, the court stated that he had provided the
31. 2 So.2d 76 (La. App. 1941).
32. Smith v. Mechanics' and Traders' Bank, 6 La. Ann. 610 (1851).
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impostor with the means of deception. In a later case3 the im-
postor had signed both the payee's name and his own in endors-
ing a check. The court held the ,drawer liable, stating that this
was an even stronger case for the protection of the drawee than
the Smith case because of the additional endorsement. The
drawer had caused the loss by his initial negligence and was held
responsible.
It may be helpful in considering the impostor rule to consult
the Louisiana law of sales by analogy. A recent case involving
a face-to-face sales transaction is Port Finance Co. v. Ber.84
There the Orleans Court of Appeal stated in dictum that the
original vendor of an automobile to an impostor could recover
possession from a subsequent bona fide purchaser because the
vendor had intended to sell to the person impersonated and not
to the person before it.8  The court based its conclusion on the
diligence exerted by the vendor to ascertain the identity and
credit rating of the impersonated vendee.38 The court, in effect,
stated that the plaintiff vendor was less negligent than the im-
postor's vendee.5 7 This dictum can be distinguished from the
typical face-to-face situations involving negotiable instruments
in that here the first victim by his diligent efforts to ascertain
the named payee's identity and credit rating indicated his in-
tention to deal only with the person named. The decision seems
to indicate that the Orleans Court of Appeal, at least by analogy,
might be unwilling in a typical impostor case to protect the bona
fide endorsee from an impostor. On the other hand, its decision
33. J. L. Levy and Salmon v. Bank of America, 24 La. Ann. 220 (1872).
34. 45 So.2d 404 (La. App. 1950).
35. The actual basis for the decision was the court's conclusion that the im-
postor had stolen the automobile and thus had acquired no title which he might
pass to anyone. The court cited article 67 of the Criminal Code defining "theft"
and stated that "if a seller (impostor here) in Louisiana obtains his goods by
theft, he cannot pass title to a bona fide purchaser," quoting from Lynn v. Lafitte,
177 So. 83 (La. App. 1937).
LA. R.S. 14:67 (1950) states: "Theft is the misappropriation or taking of
anything of value which belongs to another, either without the consent of the
other to the misappropriation or taking, or by means of fraudulent conduct, prac-
tices or representations. An intent to deprive the other permanently of whatever
may be the subject of the misappropriation or taking is essential. . ....
36. The plaintiff had telephoned to a bank to check on the credit rating and
personal description of the impersonated party; the court felt that this was suf-
ficient evidence that the vendor (drawer, by analogy) intended to deal only with
the named person and did not intend to pass title to the impostor before it.
37. The impostor had "paid" approximately $700 for the automobile and had
"sold" it the next day to the defendant, a car dealer, for $400. The court felt that
the difference in the sales price should have aroused the impostor's vendee's curi-
osity; the failure of the latter vendee to check the identity of his vendor was held
to be negligence exceeding that of the original owner.
[Vol. XVI
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can be explained by virtue of the court's rather heavy reliance
on the terms of a criminal statute defining theft, plus the fact
that the initial victim had made an extensive effort to ascertain
the payee's identity.
From this analysis of the Louisiana jurisprudence it is sub-
mitted that our courts, with the possible exception of the Orleans
Court of Appeal, would follow the majority rule and hold the
first victim liable for any resulting loss caused by the imposture,
at least, in the typical face-to-face transaction. However, be-
cause the field has not lent itself to extensive litigation, such a
conclusion necessarily must be largely conjectural.
Uniform Commercial Code8 Provisions and Changes
UCC section 3-405 states: "(1) An indorsement by any
person in the name of a named payee is effective if:
"(a) An impostor by the use of the mails or otherwise
has induced the maker or drawer to issue the instrument to
him or his confederate in the name of the payee; or
"(b) A person signing as or on behalf of a drawer in-
tends the payee to have no interest in the instrument; or
"(c) An agent or employee of the drawer has supplied
him with the name of the payee intending the latter to have
no such interest. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
The changes suggested in regard to the fictitious payee sit-
uation in subsections (b) and (c) of section 3-405 are not
within the scope of this Comment, but will be mentioned briefly.
It will be noted that an instrument payable to a fictitious payee
is not bearer paper under the Code provision as it is under the
NIL. 9 However, the Code provides that endorsement by any
person is sufficient to pass title to a bona fide purchaser; thus,
the requirement of an endorsement does not hinder the nego-
tiability to any appreciable extent. Another change is that all
reference to fictitious or non-existing persons is eliminated; the
test substituted by the Code is whether the signer intended the
payee to have no interest in the instrument. 40 The reference to
•38. UNIORM COMMERCIAL CODE, OFFICIAL DRAFT, TEXT AND COMMENTS
EDITION (1952). None of the subsequent changes adopted in the official draft
have affected § 3-405.
39. NIL § 9(3).




the "drawer" in section 3-405 (b) indicates that the Code rule
is limited to drafts, whereas under the NIL provision there was
no such restriction.41 Subsection (c) of section 3-405 enlarges
section 9 (3) of the NIL to include the situation where the em-
ployee of the drawer procures the drawing of the check. As
pointed out previously, this change has already been incorporated
into the Louisiana statute.42 Thus, the "padded payroll" cases 43
are included among those wherein the drawer employer bears
the loss as opposed to the drawee bank or other endorsee.
The effect of the codal provision on the present impostor rule
is more a codification of an established rule than a change,
though the reasoning has been changed. The proposed rule re-
jects the theory of those cases distinguishing between face-to-
face and mail transactions ;44 instead it extends the majority rule
in face-to-face transactions to the mail situation, placing the
loss on the drawer.45 Perhaps the greatest change proposed is
the abolition of the "intent" fiction. Under the Code provision
the intent of the drawer is not a consideration. The mere fact
that the impostor deceived the drawer, whether by mail or in a
face-to-face transaction, is a sufficient basis for holding the
latter liable. Furthermore the Code provides in essence that
delivery to the impersonator is not essential; the instrument
may be delivered to his "confederate" with the same result. It is
only necessary that the impostor induce the drawer "to issue the
instrument . . . in the name of the payee" 46 to him or his con-
federate.
It should be noted that effective endorsement by any person
renders the instrument negotiable almost to the same extent as
bearer paper under section 9(3) of the NIL.47 Of course, the
necessity of the impostor's affixing his signature prior to ne-
41. NIL § 9(3), quoted note 10 supra.
42. LA. R.S. 7:9(3) (1950), quoted note 11 supra. For changes proposed by
the UCC in fictitious payee situations, see IJCC 3-405, comments 3-5. See BarrTON,
BnLLS AND NoTEs § 149 (1943) ; Comment, Allocation of Losses from Check For-
geries Under the Law of Negotiable Instruments and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 62 YALE L.J. 417 (1953) ; Sutherland, Logic, Erperience, and Negotiable
Paper, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 230, 241.
43. See page 117 supra.
44. An illustrative case holding the drawee liable when the impostor had de-
ceived the drawer by mail is Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Silverman, 148 App. Div. 1,
132 N.Y. Supp. 1017 (lst Dep't 1911) ; accord, American Surety Co. v. Empire
Trust Co., 262 N.Y. 181, 186 N.E. 436 (1933). Contra, Halsey v. Bank of New
York & Trust Co., 270 N.Y. 134, 200 N.E. 671 (1936).
45. See UCC 3-405, comment 2.
.46. UCC 3-405(a).
47. For text of section, see note 10 supra.
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gotiating the instrument might be considered as a deterrent
factor, but only to a slight degree. It is not necessary that the
original impostor endorse the instrument; thus, an agent of, or
thief from, the impostor could validly endorse to a bona fide
purchaser. In other words, after his impersonation of the named
payee for the purpose of procuring the drawing of the instru-
ment, the impostor is no longer an essential party to effectuate
a valid passage of title to a bona fide purchaser. The Code pro-
vision is limited to the original parties to the instrument and
does not cover the situation where the first victim is the en-
dorser of an instrument payable to him or the procurer of a
bank's certification. Of course, the extension of the rule to
newly-drawn instruments would cover the majority of cases,
but there seems to be no logical reason why it should not also
be extended to pre-existing instruments. It is suggested that
section 3-405 should state, in effect, that the loss should fall on
the first victim of the impostor, thereby removing the present
restriction to drafts.
The omission from the Code of any reference to the intent
of the drawer is perhaps the soundest modification proposed in
the existing law. Under the present rule the intent of the drawer
is presumed so as to place the loss on him. The Code provision
merely codifies the result of the cases that utilize this fictional
intent, but it furnishes a sounder basis for such conclusions. 4
In effect, subsection (a) 49 states, as a matter of policy, that the
bona fide purchaser from the impostor will be protected no
matter what the drawer's intention was and no matter who has
endorsed the instrument. It follows logically from this fact
that if the intention of the victim is omitted from consideration
then the mode of communication between him and the impostor
becomes immaterial. Apparently, the only essential role played
by the impostor is to induce the drawer of the instrument to
make it payable to the payee whom he represents himself to be.
Still further, the instrument may be received by anyone
authorized by the impostor to receive it for him. This again is
logical because delivery by the drawer does not have any effect
48. For concurrent views, see Steinheimer, Impact of the Commercial Code on
Liability of Parties to Negotiable Instruments in Michigan, 53 MICH. L. REv. 171,
177 (1954) ; Sutherland, Logic, Experience, and Negotiable Paper, 1952 Wis. L.
Rzv. 230, 243; Comment, Allocation of Losses from Check Forgeries under the





on his intention. The drawer must bear the loss because he has
drawn the instrument to the impostor under his assumed name,
and not because he delivers it to the actual impostor rather than
the latter's agent.
However, if the impostor represents himself to be the agent
of the named payee, his endorsement of the named payee's signa-
ture will remain a forgery under the Code. "Impostor," in sec-
tion 3-405 (a), "refers to impersonation, and does not extend to
a false representation that the party is the authorized agent of
the payee."50 Yet from the standpoint of the second victim,
there seems to be no valid reason why he should not be relieved
from liability when the first victim neglects to identify the im-
postor agent, when, on the other hand, the second victim is re-
lieved if the drawer fails to detect the impersonation of the
payee himself.5' This apparent inconsistency may be explained,
in part, by the ease with which one can pose as another's agent
without detection when compared to impersonating the person
himself.
The effective endorsement by any person provided by the
Code seems to be an adequate provision to enable anyone who
obtains the instrument from the impostor to endorse effectively.
The policy is to protect the innocent second victim (endorsee);
hence, once the drawer has been swindled, he must bear the
loss as against any bona fide endorsee. Further, there would
seem to be no adequate argument in favor of the protection of
the impostor against a thief. The Code demands that the en-
dorsee require a regular chain of endorsements. It is submitted
that this provision is sounder than the "bearer paper" rule in
regard to fictitious payees in NIL section 9 (3) .52 The Code pro-
vision affords easier detection of fraud by the endorsee because
of the necessity of endorsement by the impostor.
50. UCC 3-405, comment 2. See also UCC 3-404: "(1) Any unauthorized sig-
nature is wholly inoperative as that of the person whose name is signed unless
he ratifies it or is precluded from denying it; but it operates as the signature of
the unauthorized signer in favor of any person who in good faith pays the instru-
ment or takes it for value.
"(2) Any unauthorized signature may be ratified for all purposes of this
article. Such ratification does not of itself affect any rights of the person ratify-
ing against the actual signer." For the text of the corresponding article of the
NIL, see note 5 8upra.
51. For criticism of this omission, see Comment, The Fictitious Payee and the
U.O.7. - The Demise of a Gho8t, 18 U. OF CHi. L. REv. 281 (1950).




The failure of the Code to provide for "pre-existing" instru-
ments, that is, instances where the initial victim is the endorser
of a check made payable to him by a third party drawer, appears
to the writer to be a serious omission. There seems to be no
logical reason why protection should not be affored to an en-
dorsee of an instrument when the first victim of the impostor
is the payee or simply a prior endorser.58 The fact that the first
victim is an original party to the instrument, namely, the drawer
or maker, should not affect the liability of subsequent endorsees
from the impostor. It is submitted that the impostor should be
able to pass valid title to a good faith endorsee simply because
he has induced the first victim54 to deliver it to him in the name
of the impersonated payee.
On the whole, however, the provision of the Code is an im-
provement over the present law in regard to impostors because
the replacement of a fictional doctrine with statutory liability
will provide a more sound basis in the law. First, by providing
statutory liability, the likelihood of uniformity in the jurispru-
dence will be enhanced. Second, the courts will not be compelled
to substantiate a fictional rationale, a fact which should lend
credence to the decisions. The placing of the loss on the initial
victim seems justified so long as the second victim-endorsee is
not guilty of greater negligence than the drawer. Although the
proposed statute makes liability dependent upon the use of care
by the drawer only, this method of determining liability seems
justified in view of the Uniform Code's primary purpose of
insuring negotiability of the instrument.
Huntington Odom
53. The second victim (endorsee) will be protected if the impostor procured
the instrument from the original maker or drawer. But, if the impostor defrauds
the payee of a check, for instance, and induces him to endorse to the impostor,
the latter will acquire title and the endorsee from the impostor will be protected.
The inconsistency here does not seem justified because the first victim has been
deceived in both cases and the second victim is innocent in both cases. The latter
party should not be afforded protection in the one instance and denied it in the
other.
54. "First victim" includes drawer, maker, endorsing payee, endorsee, etc.
19551
